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Abstract
When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel com-
pelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system’s approval. Models of agent responsive-
ness, termed ”strategic manipulation,” analyze the interaction between a learner and agents
in a world where all agents are equally able to manipulate their features in an attempt to
“trick” a published classifier. In cases of real world classification, however, an agent’s ability
to adapt to an algorithm is not simply a function of her personal interest in receiving a pos-
itive classification, but is bound up in a complex web of social factors that affect her ability
to pursue certain action responses. In this paper, we adapt models of strategic manipulation
to capture dynamics that may arise in a setting of social inequality wherein candidate groups
face different costs to manipulation. We find that whenever one group’s costs are higher than
the other’s, the learner’s equilibrium strategy exhibits an inequality-reinforcing phenomenon
wherein the learner erroneously admits some members of the advantaged group, while erro-
neously excluding some members of the disadvantaged group. We also consider the effects of
interventions in which a learner subsidizes members of the disadvantaged group, lowering their
costs in order to improve her own classification performance. Here we encounter a paradoxical
result: there exist cases in which providing a subsidy improves only the learner’s utility while
actually making both candidate groups worse-off—even the group receiving the subsidy. Our
results reveal the potentially adverse social ramifications of deploying tools that attempt to
evaluate an individual’s “quality” when agents’ capacities to adaptively respond differ.
1 Introduction
The expanding realm of algorithmic decision-making has not only altered the ways that institutions
conduct their day-to-day operations, but has also had a profound impact on how individuals
interface with these institutions. It has changed the ways we communicate with each other, receive
crucial resources, and are granted important social and economic opportunities. Theoretically,
algorithms have great potential to reform existing systems to become both more efficient and
equitable, but as exposed by various high-profile investigations [1, 2, 3, 4], prediction-based models
that make or assist with consequential decisions are, in practice, highly prone to reproducing past
and current patterns of social inequality.
While few algorithmic systems are explicitly designed to be discriminatory, there are many
underlying forces that drive such socially biased outcomes. For one, since most of the features
used in these models are based on proxy, rather than causal, variables, outputs often reflect the
various structural factors that bear on a person’s life opportunities rather than the individualized
characteristics that decision-makers often seek. Much of the previous work in algorithmic fairness
has examined a particular undesirable proxy effect in which a classifier’s features may be linked to
socially significant and legally protected attributes like race and gender, interpreting correlations
that have arisen due to centuries of accumulated disadvantage as genuine attributes of a particular
category of people [5, 6, 7, 8].
But algorithmic models do not only generate outcomes that passively correlate with social
advantages or disadvantages. These tools also provoke a certain type of reactivity, in which agents
see a classifier as a guide to action and actively change their behavior to accord with the algorithm’s
preferences. On this view, classifiers both evaluate and animate their subjects, transforming static
data into strategic responses. Just as an algorithm’s use of certain features differentially advantages
some populations over others, the room for strategic response that is inherent in many automated
systems also naturally favors social groups of privilege. Admissions procedures that heavily weight
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SAT scores motivate students who have the means to take advantage of test prep courses and even
take the exam multiple times. Loan approval systems that rely on existing lines of credit as an
indication of creditworthiness encourage those who can to apply for more credit in their name.
Thus an algorithm that scores applicants to determine how a resource should be allocated sets
a standard for what an ideal candidate’s features ought to be. A responsive subject would look
to alter how she appears to a classifier in order to increase her likelihood of gaining the system’s
approval. But since reactivity typically requires informational and material resources that are
not equally accessible to all, even when an algorithm draws on features that seem to arise out of
individual effort, these metrics can be skewed to favor those who are more readily able to alter
their features.
In the machine learning literature, agent reactivity to a classifier is termed “strategic ma-
nipulation.” Since previous work in strategic classification has typically depicted agent-classifier
interactions as antagonistic, such actions are usually viewed as distortions that aim to undermine a
learner’s classifier [9, 10]. As shown in Hardt et al. [10], a learner who anticipates these responses
can, under certain formulations of agent costs, adapt to protect against the misclassification er-
rors that would have resulted from manipulation, recovering an accuracy level that is arbitrarily
close to the theoretical maximum. These results are welcome news for a learner who correctly
assesses agents’ best-responses. Indeed in most strategic manipulation models, agents are depicted
as equally able to pursue manipulation, allowing the learner who knows their costs to accurately
preempt strategic responses. While there are occasions in which agents do largely face homogenous
costs—an even playing field—in many other social use cases of machine learning tools, agents do
not encounter the same costs of altering the attributes that are ultimately observed and assessed
by the classifier. As such, in this paper we ask, “What are the effects of strategic classification and
manipulation in a world of social stratification?”
As in previous work in strategic classification, we cast the problem as a Stackelberg game
in which the learner moves first and publishes her classifier before candidates best-respond and
manipulate their features [9, 10, 11, 12]. But in contrast with the models in Bru¨ckner & Scheffer
[9] and Hardt et al. [10], we formalize the setting of a society comprised of social groups that not
only may differ in terms of distributions over unmanipulated features and true labeling functions
but also face different costs to manipulation. This extra set of differences brings to light questions
that favor an analysis that focuses on the welfares of the candidates who must contend with these
classifiers: Do classifiers formulated with strategic behavior in mind impose disparate burdens on
different groups? If so, how can a learner mitigate these adverse effects? The altered gameplay
and outcomes of strategic classification beg questions of fairness that are intertwined with those of
optimality.
Though our model is quite general, we obtain technical results that reveal important social
ramifications of using classification in systems marked by deep inequalities and a potential for
manipulation. Our analysis shows that, under our model, even when the learner knows the costs
faced by different groups, her equilibrium classifier will always act to reinforce existing inequalities
by mistakenly excluding qualified candidates who are less able to manipulate their features while
also mistakenly admitting those candidates for whom manipulation is less costly, perpetuating the
relative advantage of the privileged group. We delve into the cost disparities that generate such
inevitable classification errors.
Next, we consider the impact of providing subsidies to lighten the burden of manipulation for
the disadvantaged group. We find that such an intervention can improve the learner’s classification
performance as well as mitigate the extent to which her errors are inequality-reinforcing. How-
ever, we show that there exist cases in which providing subsidies enforces an equilibrium learner
strategy that actually makes some individual candidates worse-off without making any better-off.
Paradoxically, in these cases, paying a subsidy to the disadvantaged group actually benefits only
the learner while both candidate groups experience a welfare decline! Further analysis of these sce-
narios reveals that, in many cases, all parties would have preferred a world in which manipulation
of features was not possible for any candidates.
Our paper’s agent-centric analysis views data points as representing individuals and classifica-
tions as impacting those individuals’ welfares. This orientation departs from the dominant per-
spective in learning theory, which privileges a vendor’s predictive accuracy, and instead evaluates
classification regimes in light of the social consequences of the outcomes they issue. By incorpo-
rating insights and techniques from game theory and economics, domains that consider deeply the
effects of various policies on agents’ behaviors and outcomes, we hope to broaden the perspective
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that machine learning takes on socially-oriented tools. Presenting more democratically-inclined
analysis has been central to the field of algorithmic fairness, and we hope our work sheds new light
on this generic setting of classification with strategic agents.
1.1 Related Work
While many earlier approaches to strategic classification in the machine learning literature have
tended to view learner-agent interactions as adversarial [13, 14], our work does not assume in-
herently antagonistic relationships, and instead, shares the Stackelberg game-theoretic perspective
akin to that presented in Bru¨ckner & Scheffer [9] and built upon by Hardt et al. [10]. Departing
from these models’ focus on static prediction and homogeneous manipulation costs, Dong et al.
[15] propose an online setting of strategic classification in which agents appear sequentially and
have individual costs for manipulation that are unknown to the learner. Unlike our work, they take
a traditional learner-centric view, whereas our concerns are with the welfare of the candidates.
Agent features and potential manipulations in the face of a learner classifier can also be inter-
preted as serving informational purposes. In the economics literature on signaling theory, agents
interact with a principal—the counterpart to our learner—via signals that convey important infor-
mation relevant to a particular task at hand. Classic works, such as Spence’s paper on job-market
signaling, focus their analysis on the varying quality of information that signals provide at equi-
librium [16]. The emphasis in our analysis on different group costs shares features with a recent
update to the signaling literature by Frankel & Kartik [17], who also distinguish between natural
actions, corresponding to unmanipulated features in our model, and “gaming” ability, which oper-
ate similarly to our cost functions. The connection between gaming capacity and social advantage
is also explicitly discussed in work by Esteban & Ray [18] who consider the effects of wealth and
lobbying on governmental resource allocation. While most works in the economics signaling liter-
ature center on the decay of the informativeness of signals as gaming and natural actions become
indistinguishable, some recent work in computer science has also considered the effect of costly sig-
naling on mechanism design [19, 20]. In contrast to both of these perspectives, our work highlights
the effect of manipulation on a learner’s action and as a consequence, on the agents’ welfares.
In independent, concurrent work appearing at the same conference, Milli et al. [21] also consider
the social impacts of strategic classification. Whereas our model highlights the interplay between a
learner’s Stackelberg equilibrium classifier and agents’ best-response manipulations at the feature
level, their work traces the relationship between the learner’s utility and the social burden, a
measure of agents’ manipulation costs. They show that an institution must select a point on
the outcome curve that trades off its predictive accuracy with the social burden it imposes. In
their model, an agent with an unmanipulated feature vector x has a likelihood `(x) of having a
positive label and can manipulate to any vector y with `(y) ≤ `(x) at zero cost, or to y with
`(y) > `(x) for a positive cost. This assumption, called “outcome monotonicity,” allows them to
reason about manipulations in (one-dimensional) likelihood space rather than feature space, since
the optimal learner strategies amount to thresholds on likelihoods. In contrast, we allow features
to be differently manipulable (perhaps a student can boost her SAT score via test prep courses,
but can do nothing to change her grades from the previous year, and cannot freely obtain a higher
SAT score in exchange for a worse record of extracurricular activities), which affects the forms of
both the learner’s equilibrium classifier and agents’ best-response manipulations. Despite these
differences in model and focus, their analysis yields results that are qualitatively similar to ours.
Highlighting the differential impact of classifiers on social groups, they also find that overcoming
stringent thresholds is more burdensome on the disadvantaged group.
2 Model Formalization
As in Bru¨ckner & Scheffer [9] and Hardt et al. [10], we formalize the Strategic Classification Game
as a Stackelberg competition in which the learner moves first by committing to and publishing a
binary classifier f . Candidates, who are endowed with “innate” features, best respond by manipu-
lating their feature inputs into the classifier. Formally, a candidate is defined by her d-dimensional
feature vector x ∈ X = [0, 1]d and group membership A or B, with A signifying the advantaged
group and B the disadvantaged. Group membership bears on manipulation costs such that a
candidate from group m who wishes to move from a feature vector x to a feature vector y must
pay a cost of cm(y) − cm(x). We note that these cost function forms are similar to the class of
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separable cost functions considered in Hardt et al. [10]. We assume that higher feature values
indicate higher quality to the learner, and thus restrict our attention to manipulations such that
y ≥ x, where the symbol ≥ signifies a component-wise comparison such that y ≥ x if and only
if ∀i ∈ [d], yi ≥ xi. Throughout this paper, we study non-negative monotone cost functions such
that the cost of manipulating from a feature vector x to a feature vector y increases as x and y
get further apart.
To motivate this distinction between features and costs, consider the use of SAT scores as a
signal of academic preparedness in the U.S. college admissions process. The high-stakes nature of
the SAT has encouraged the growth of a test prep industry dedicated to helping students perform
better on the exam. Test preparation books and courses, while also exposing students to content
knowledge and skills that are covered on the SAT, promise to “hack” the exam by training students
to internalize test-taking strategies based on the format, structure, and style of its questions. One
can view SAT scores as a feature used by a learner building a classifier to select candidates with
sufficient academic success according to some chosen standard. The existence of test prep resources
then presents an opportunity for some applicants to inflate their scores, which might “trick” the
tool into classifying the candidates as more highly qualified than they are in actuality. In this
example, a candidate’s strategic manipulation move refers to her investment in these resources,
which despite improving her exam score, do not confer any genuine benefits to her level of academic
preparation for college.
Just as access to test prep resources tends to fall along income and race lines, we view candi-
dates’ different abilities to manipulate as tied to their group membership. We model these group
differences with respect to availability of resources and opportunity by enforcing a cost condition
that orders the two groups. We suppose that for all x ∈ [0, 1]d and y ≥ x,
cA(y)− cA(x) ≤ cB(y)− cB(x). (1)
Manipulating from a feature vector x to y is always at least as costly for a member of group B
as it is for a member of group A. We believe our model’s inclusion of this cost condition reflects
an authentic aspect of our social world wherein one group is systematically disadvantaged with
respect to a task in comparison to another.
In our setup, we also allow groups to have distinct probability distributions DA and DB over
unmanipulated features and to be subject to different true labeling functions hA and hB defined
as
hA(x) =
{
1, ∀x such that ∑di=1 wA,ixi ≥ τA,
0, ∀x such that ∑di=1 wA,ixi < τA, (2)
hB(x) =
{
1, ∀x such that ∑di=1 wB,ixi ≥ τB ,
0, ∀x such that ∑di=1 wB,ixi < τB . (3)
We assume that hA(x) = 1 =⇒ hB(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Returning to the SAT example,
research has shown that scores are skewed by race even before factoring in additional considera-
tions such as access to manipulation [22]. In such cases, the true threshold for the disadvantaged
group is lower than that for the advantaged group. We leave this generality in our model to
acknowledge and account for the influence that various social and historical factors have on can-
didates’ unmanipulated features and not, we emphasize, as an endorsement of a view that groups
are fundamentally different in ability. A formal description of the Strategic Classification Game
with Groups is given in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Strategic Classification Game with Groups). In the Strategic Classification Game
with Groups, candidates with features x ∈ [0, 1]d and group memberships A or B are drawn from
distributions DA and DB. The population proportion of each group is given by pA and pB where
pA + pB = 1. A candidate from group m pays cost cm(y) − cm(x) to move from her original
features x to y ≥ x. There exist true binary classifiers hA and hB, for candidates of each group.
Probability distributions, cost functions, and true binary classifiers are all common knowledge.
Gameplay proceeds in the following manner:
1. The learner issues a classifier f generating outcomes {0, 1}.
2. Each candidate observes f and manipulates her features x to y ≥ x.
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A group m candidate with features x who moves to y earns a payoff
f(y)− (cm(y)− cm(x)).
The learner incurs a penalty of
CFP
∑
m∈{A,B}
pmPx∼Dm [hm(x) = 0, f(y) = 1]
+ CFN
∑
m∈{A,B}
pmPx∼Dm [hm(x) = 1, f(y) = 0],
where CFP and CFN denote the cost of a false positive and a false negative respectively.
The learner looks to correctly classify candidates with respect to their original features x,
whereas each candidate hopes to manipulate her features to attain a positive classification, ex-
pending as little cost as possible in the process. Under this setup, candidates are only willing to
manipulate their features if it flips their classification from 0 to 1 and if the cost of the manipu-
lation is less than 1. We note that defining the utility of a positive classification to be 1 can be
considered a scaling and thus is without loss of generality.
This learner-candidate interaction is very similar to that studied in Hardt et al. [10]. How-
ever, our inclusion of groups with distinct manipulation costs leads to an ambiguity regarding a
candidate’s initial features that does not exist when all candidates have an equal opportunity to
manipulate. In very few cases can a vendor distinguish among candidates based on their group
membership for the explicit purpose of issuing distinct classification policies, especially if that
group category is a protected class attribute. As such, in our setup, we require that a learner
publish a classifier that is not adaptive to different agents based on their group identities.
It is important to note that the positive results in Hardt et al.’s [10] formulation of the Strategic
Classification Game, wherein for separable cost functions, the learner can attain a classification
error at test-time that is arbitrarily close to the optimal payoff attainable, do not carry over into
this setting of heterogeneous groups and costs. Even when hA = hB , the existence of different costs
of agent manipulation, even when separable as in our model, introduces a base uncertainty to the
learning problem that generates errors that cannot be extricated so long as the learner must publish
a classifier that does not distinguish candidates based on their group memberships. Second, an
analysis of the learner’s strategy and performance, the perspective typically taken in most learning
theory papers, contributes only a partial view of the total welfare effect of using classification
in strategic settings. The main objective of this paper is to offer a more thorough and holistic
inspection of all agents’ outcomes, paying special heed to the different outcomes experienced by
candidates of the two groups. Insofar as all social behaviors are impelled by goals, interests,
and purposes, we should view data that is strategically generated to be the rule rather than the
exception in social machine learning settings.
Remark on the assumption that hA and hB are known.
Our assumption that the learner has knowledge of groups’ true labeling functions is not central
to our analysis. We make such an assumption to highlight the pure effect of groups’ differential
costs of manipulation on equilibrium gameplay and consequent welfares rather than the potential
side effects due to a learner’s noisy estimation of the true classifiers. Our general findings do not
substantially rely on this feature of the model, and the overall results carry through into a setting
in which the learner optimizes from samples.
Remark on unequal group costs
The differences in costs cA and cB encoded by the cost condition is not restricted to referring
only to differences in the monetary cost of manipulation. Instead, as is common in information
economics and especially signaling theory, “cost” reflects the multiplicity of factors that bear on
the effort exertion required by feature manipulation [16, 23, 24, 25]. To demonstrate the generality
of our formulation of distinct group costs, we show that the cost condition given in (1) is equivalent
to a more explicit derivation of the choice that an agent faces when deciding whether to manipulate
her feature.
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A rational agent with feature x will only pursue manipulation if her value for a positive classi-
fication minus her cost of manipulation exceeds her value for a negative classification:
v(f(x) = 0) ≤ v(f(y) = 1)− u(c(y)− c(x)). (4)
The monotone function u translates the costs borne by a candidate to manipulate from x to y into
her “utility space,” i.e., it reflects the value that she places on that expenditure. We can rewrite
the previous inequality to be
c(y)− c(x) ≤ u−1(v(f(y) = 1)− v(f(x) = 0)). (5)
Substituting in k = u−1
(
v(f(y) = 1)− v(f(x) = 0)), we have c(y)− c(x) ≤ k. Since the same cost
expenditure is valued more highly by the disadvantaged group than by the advantaged group, the
function u is more convex for group B than for group A. Thus all else equal, we have cA(y) −
cA(x) ≤ cB(y)− cB(x) as desired. More generally, the functions v, c, and u may each be different
for the groups. As such, the disadvantage encoded in the cost condition can arise due to differences
in valuations of classifications (v), differences in costs (c), or differences in valuations of those costs
(u).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We begin by studying agents’ best-response strategies in the basic Strategic Manipulation Game
with Groups in which candidates belong to one of two groups A and B, and the cost condition
holds so that group B members face greater costs to manipulation than group A members. To
build intuition, we first consider best-response strategies in the one-dimensional case in which
candidates have features x ∈ [0, 1] and group cost functions are of any non-negative monotone
form. We then move on to consider the d-dimensional case in which candidate features are given
as vectors x ∈ [0, 1]d and manipulation costs are assumed to be linear.
3.1 One-dimensional Features
In the d = 1 case, the cost condition given in (1) may be written as c′A(x) ≤ c′B(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Since the true decision boundaries are linear, in the one-dimensional case, they may be written as
threshold functions where thresholds τA and τB are constants in [0, 1] and for agents in group m,
hm(x) = 1 if and only if x ≥ τm. A university admissions decision based on a single score is an
example of such a classifier. Although the SAT does not act as the sole determinant of admissions
in the U.S., in countries such as Australia, Brazil, and China, a single exam score is often the only
factor of applicant quality that is considered for admissions.
When the learner has access to τA and τB , and group costs cA and cB satisfy the cost condition,
the following proposition characterizes the space of undominated strategies for the learner who seeks
to minimize any error-penalizing cost function.
Proposition 1 (One-D Undominated Learner Strategies). Given group cost functions cA and cB
and true label thresholds τA and τB where τB ≤ τA, there exists a space of undominated learner
threshold strategies [σB , σA] ⊂ [0, 1] where σA = c−1A (cA(τA) + 1) and σB = c−1B (cB(τB) + 1).
That is, for any error penalties CFP and CFN , the learner’s equilibrium classifier f is based on a
threshold σ ∈ [σB , σA] such that for all manipulated features y,
f(y) =
{
1, ∀y ≥ σ,
0, ∀y < σ. (6)
To understand this result, first notice that if the learner were to face only those candidates
from group A, she would achieve perfect classification by labeling as 1 only those candidates with
unmanipulated feature x ≥ τA. This strategy is enacted by considering candidates’ best-response
manipulations. A rational candidate would only be willing to manipulate her feature if the gain
she receives in her classification exceeds her costs of manipulation. The learner would like to guard
against manipulations by candidates with x < τA but still admit candidates with x ≥ τA, so
she considers the maximum manipulated feature y that is attainable by a rational candidate with
x = τA who is willing to spend up to a cost of one in order to secure a better classification, as
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Figure 1: Group cost functions for a one-dimensional feature x. τA and τB signify true thresholds
on unmanipulated features for group A and B, but a learner must issue a classifier on manipulated
features. The threshold σA perfectly classifies group A candidates; σB perfectly classifies group B
candidates. A learner selects an equilibrium threshold σ∗ ∈ [σB , σA], committing false positives on
group A (red bracket) and false negatives on group B (blue bracket).
illustrated in Figure 1. The maximum such y value is σA, and thus, the learner sets a threshold
at σA, admitting all those with y ≥ σA and rejecting all those with y < σA. The same reasoning
applies to a learner facing only group B candidates, and the learner sets a threshold at σB ,
admitting all those candidates with y ≥ σB and rejecting all those with y < σB .
It can be shown that for all valid values of τA, τB , cA, and cB , necessarily σB ≤ σA. Then all
classifiers with threshold σ < σB are dominated by σB , in the sense that for any arbitrary error
penalties CFP and CFN , the learner would suffer higher costs by setting her threshold to be σ
rather than σB . In the same way, all thresholds σ > σA are dominated by σA, thus leaving [σB , σA]
to be the space of undominated thresholds. For an account of the full proof of this result (and all
omitted proofs), see the appendix.
Even without committing to a particular learner cost function, the space of optimal strate-
gies characterized in Proposition 1 leads to an important consequence. A rational learner in the
Strategic Classification Game always selects a classifier that exhibits the following phenomenon: it
mistakenly admits unqualified candidates from the group with lower costs and mistakenly excludes
qualified candidates from the group with higher costs. This result is formalized in Proposition 2.
To state the proposition, the following definition is instructive. Whereas the true thresholds
τA and τB are a function of unmanipulated features, the learner only faces candidate features that
may have been manipulated. In order to make these observed features commensurable with τA
and τB , it is helpful for the learner to “translate” a candidate’s possibly manipulated feature y to
its minimum corresponding original unmanipulated value.
Definition 2 (Correspondence with unmanipulated features). For any observed candidate feature
y ∈ [0, 1], the minimum corresponding unmanipulated feature is defined as
`A(y) = max{0, c−1A (cA(y)− 1)},
`B(y) = max{0, c−1B (cB(y)− 1)}
(7)
for a candidate belonging to group A and group B respectively.
The corresponding values `A(y) and `B(y) are defined such that a candidate who presents
feature y must have as her true unmanipulated feature x ≥ `A(y) if she is a group A member and
x ≥ `B(y) if she is a group B member.
Proposition 2 (Learner’s Cost in 1 Dimension). A learner who employs a classifier f based on a
threshold strategy σ ∈ [σB , σA] only commits false positives errors on group A and false negatives
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errors on group B. The cost C(σ) of such a classifier is
CFNpBPx∼DB
[
x ∈ [τB , `B(σ))
]
+ CFP pAPx∼DA
[
x ∈ [`A(σ), τA)
]
,
where false negative errors entail penalty CFN , and false positive errors entail penalty CFP .
A learner who commits to classifying only one of the groups correctly bears costs given by the
following corollaries.
Corollary 1. A classifier based on σA perfectly classifies group A candidates and bears cost
C(σA) = CFNpBPx∼DB
[
x ∈ [τB , `B(σ))
]
.
Corollary 2. A classifier based on σB perfectly classifies group B candidates and bears cost
C(σB) = CFP pAPx∼DA
[
x ∈ [`A(σ), τA)
]
.
Notice that the learner’s errors always cut in the same direction—by unduly benefiting group
A candidates and unduly rejecting group B candidates, these errors act to reinforce the existing
social inequality that had generated the unequal group cost conditions in the first place. Since
these errors arise out of the asymmetric group costs of manipulation, the Strategic Classification
Game can be viewed as an interactive model that itself perpetuates the relative advantage of group
A over group B candidates.
Within the undominated region [σB , σA], the equilibrium learner threshold σ
∗ is attained as
the solution to the optimization problem
σ∗ = arg min
σ∈[σB ,σA]
C(σ). (8)
In the game’s greatest generality where candidates are drawn from arbitrary probability distri-
butions, groups bear any costs that abide by the cost condition, and the learner has arbitrary
error penalties, one cannot specify the equilibrium learner threshold σ∗ any further. However,
under some special cases of candidate cost functions and probability distributions, the equilibrium
threshold can be characterized more precisely. Specifically, when candidates from both groups are
assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution over unmanipulated features in [0, 1], an error-
minimizing learner seeks a threshold value σ∗ that minimizes the length of the interval of errors,
given by the following quantity:
σ∗ = arg min
σ∈[σB ,σA]
`B(σ)− `A(σ).
From here, one natural assumption of candidate cost functions would have that groups A and B
bear costs that are proportional to each other. In this case, the curvature of the cost functions is
determinative of a learner’s equilibrium threshold.
Proposition 3. Suppose group cost functions are proportional such that cA(x) = qcB(x) for
q ∈ (0, 1), that DA and DB are uniform on [0, 1], and that CFN = CFP and pA = pB = 12 . Let σ∗
be the learner’s equilibrium threshold.
When cost functions are strictly concave, σ∗ = σB. When cost functions are strictly convex,
σ∗ = σA. When cost functions are affine, the learner is indifferent between all σ∗ ∈ [σB , σA].
3.2 General d-Dimensional Feature Vectors
In the general d-dimensional case of the Strategic Classification Game, candidates are endowed
with features that are given by a vector x ∈ [0, 1]d and can choose to manipulate and present any
feature y ≥ x to the learner. In this section, we consider optimal learner and candidate strategies
when group costs are linear such that they may be written as
cA(x) =
d∑
i=1
cA,ixi; cB(x) =
d∑
i=1
cB,ixi (9)
for groups A and B respectively. Now, the cost condition cA(y) − cA(x) ≤ cB(y) − cB(x) for all
y ≥ x—defined component-wise as before—implies that ∀i ∈ [d], cA,i ≤ cB,i. In d dimensions, the
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Figure 2: The forward simplex. A candidate in group A with unmanipulated feature vector x can
manipulate to reach any feature vector y ∈ ∆A(x) at a cost of at most 1.
true classifiers hA and hB have linear decision boundaries such that for a group A candidate with
feature x,
hA(x) =
{
1
∑d
i=1 wA,ixi ≥ τA,
0
∑d
i=1 wA,ixi < τA,
(10)
and for a group B candidate with feature x,
hB(x) =
{
1
∑d
i=1 wB,ixi ≥ τB ,
0
∑d
i=1 wB,ixi < τB .
(11)
We assume that all components xi contribute positively to an agent’s likelihood of being classified
as 1 so that wA,i, wB,i ≥ 0 for all i. To ensure that the cost of manipulation is always non-negative,
all cost coefficients are positive: cB,i, cA,i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [d].
A candidate may now manipulate any combination of the d components of her initial feature
x to reach the final feature y that she presents to the learner. Despite this increased flexibility on
the part of the candidate, we are still able to characterize the performance of undominated learner
classifiers, generalizing the result in Proposition 2. All potentially optimal classifiers exhibit the
same inequality-reinforcing property inherent within the one-dimensional interval of undominated
threshold strategies, trading off false positives on group A candidates with false negatives on group
B candidates. Before we formally present this result, we first describe candidates’ best-response
strategies. Here, a geometric view of the space of potential manipulations is informative.
Suppose a candidate endowed with a feature vector x faces costs
∑d
i=1 cixi and is willing to
expend a total cost of 1 for manipulation. Then she can move to any y ≥ x contained within
the d-simplex with orthogonal corner at x and remaining vertices at x + 1ci ei where ei is the ith
standard basis vector. This region is given by
∆(x) =
{
x +
d∑
i=1
ti
ci
ei ∈ [0, 1]d
∣∣∣ d∑
i=1
ti ≤ 1 ; ti ≥ 0 ∀i
}
. (12)
∆(x), depicted in Figure 2, gives the space of potential movement for a candidate with unmanip-
ulated feature x who is willing to expend a total cost of 1. Notice that ti can be interpreted as the
cost that a candidate expends on movement in the ith direction. Thus
∑d
i=1 ti gives the total cost
of manipulation. Moving beyond the range of possible moves, in order to describe how a rational
candidate will best-respond to a learner, we must consider the published classifier.
Suppose a learner publishes a classifier f based on a hyperplane
∑d
i=1 giyi = g0, so that
f(y) = 1 if and only if
∑d
i=1 giyi ≥ g0. A best-response manipulation occurs along the direction
that generates the greatest increase in the value
∑d
i=1 gi(yi − xi) for the least cost. As such, a
candidate will move in any directions i ∈ arg maxi∈[d] gici . This result is formalized in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 (d-D Candidate Best Response). Suppose a learner publishes the classifier f(y) = 1 if
and only if
∑d
i=1 giyi ≥ g0. Consider a candidate with unmanipulated feature vector x and linear
costs
∑d
i=1 cixi. If f(x) = 1 or if for all i ∈ [d], f(x + 1ci ei) = 0, the candidate’s best response is
to set y = x. Otherwise, letting K = arg maxi∈[d]
gi
ci
, her manipulation takes the form
y = x +
d∑
i=1
ti
ci
ei
for any t such that ti ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [d], ti = 0 for all i /∈ K, and
∑d
i=1 gi(xi +
ti
ci
) = g0.
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Figure 3: A perfect classifier for group A. Every candidate with unmanipulated feature vector x
on or above the true decision boundary for group A is able to manipulate to a point y ∈ ∆A(x) on
or above the blue decision boundary depicted here. No candidate with an unmanipulated feature
vector below the true decision boundary is able to do so. The kink in the blue decision boundary
arises due to the restriction of features to [0, 1]d. A perfect classifier for group A does not need to
have this kink; for example, a more lenient perfect classifier can be formed by “straightening” it
out.
While in the d-dimensional case, a candidate has many more choices of manipulation directions
to pursue, a best response strategy will always lead her to increase her feature in those components
that are most valued by the learner and least costly for manipulation. That is, she behaves
according to a “bang for your buck” principle, in which the optimal manipulations are in the
direction or directions where the ratio gici is highest.
Despite the fact that the optimal manipulation may not be unique, as in the cases where
there are multiple equivalently good directions for a candidate to move in, a learner who knows
candidates’ costs can still anticipate best-response manipulations and avoid errors on that group.
As such, we are once again able to construct a perfect classifier for candidates of group A and a
perfect classifier for candidates of group B.
Theorem 1 (d-D Space of Dominant Learner Strategies). In the general d-dimensional Strategic
Classification Game with linear costs, there exists a classifier that perfectly classifies group A and
a classifier that perfectly classifies group B. All undominated classifiers commit no false negative
errors on group A and no false positive errors on group B.
A full exposition of the proof appears in the appendix, but here we present an abbreviated
explanation of the result.
For each group m, the learner computes an optimal boundary that perfectly classifies all of its
members by considering the set of simplices {∆m(x)} anchored at the vectors x¯ that satisfy wᵀmx¯ =
τm and drawing the strictest hyperplane that intersects each simplex. That is for all hyperplanes
gi :
∑d
j=1 gi,jxj = gi,0 that are constructed to intersect each simplex, then g1 :
∑d
j=1 g1,jxj = g1,0
is the strictest if for all x ∈ [0, 1]d,
d∑
j=1
g1,jxj = g1,0 =⇒
d∑
j=1
gi,jxj = gi,0 ≥ gj,0
for all gi. Due to the cost ordering, for any x ∈ [0, 1]d, ∆B(x) ⊆ ∆A(x), and thus wherever a
comparison is possible, the group A boundary is at least as strict as the group B boundary. Figure
3 gives a visualization of a boundary formed by connecting the simplices ∆(x¯); the corresponding
classifier perfectly classifies the group.
As in the one-dimensional general costs case, learner strategies necessarily entail inequality-
reinforcing classifiers: a rational learner equipped with any error-penalizing cost function will
select an equilibrium strategy that trades off undue optimism with respect to group A for undue
pessimism with respect to group B. We note that except in the extreme case in which there exists
a perfect classifier for all candidates in the population, this result implies that the classifier for
group A issues false negatives on group B, and the classifier for group B issues false positives on
group A. In order to formalize this result, we would like to generalize the idea behind the minimum
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Figure 4: The backward simplex. A candidate in group A with manipulated feature vector y could
have started with any feature vector x ∈ ∆−1A (y) and paid a cost of at most 1.
correspondence unmanipulated features given by `A(·) and `B(·) in (7) for general d-dimensions
and linear costs.
A learner who observes a possibly manipulated feature vector y must consider the space of
unmanipulated feature vectors that the candidate could have had. Thus we can make use of
the simplex idea of potential manipulation; however in this case, the learner seeks to project a
simplex “backward” to “undo” the potential candidate manipulation. Since groups are subject to
different costs, simplices ∆−1A (y) and ∆
−1
B (y)—a depiction is given in Figure 4—which represent
the region from where a candidate could have manipulated, will differ based on the candidate’s
group membership, with
∆−1A (y) =
{
y −
d∑
i=1
ti
cA,i
ei ∈ [0, 1]d
∣∣∣ d∑
i=1
ti ≤ 1 ; ti ≥ 0 ∀i
}
, (13)
∆−1B (y) =
{
y −
d∑
i=1
ti
cB,i
ei ∈ [0, 1]d
∣∣∣ d∑
i=1
ti ≤ 1 ; ti ≥ 0 ∀i
}
. (14)
We can now use these constructs in order to define d-dimensional generalizations of `A(y) and
`B(y).
Definition 3 (Correspondence with Unmanipulated Features in d-D). For any observed candidate
feature y ∈ [0, 1]d, the minimum corresponding unmanipulated feature vectors are given by
`A(y) =
{
x ∈ ∆−1A (y) ∩ [0, 1]d
∣∣@xˆ ∈ ∆−1A (y) such that xˆ < x}, (15)
`B(y) =
{
x ∈ ∆−1B (y) ∩ [0, 1]d
∣∣@xˆ ∈ ∆−1B (y) such that xˆ < x} (16)
for a candidate belonging to group A and group B respectively.
The corresponding values `A(y) and `B(y) are defined such that a candidate who presents
feature y must have had a true unmanipulated feature vector x ≥ x¯ for some x¯ ∈ `A(y) if she is a
group A member and x ≥ x¯ for some x¯ ∈ `B(y) if she is a group B member.
For any hyperplane decision boundary g containing vectors y, the minimum corresponding
feature vectors given by `A(y) and `B(y) are helpful for determining the effective thresholds that
g generates on unmanipulated features for groups A and B.
Lemma 2. Suppose a learner classifier f is based on a hyperplane g :
∑d
i=1 gixi = g0. Construct
the set
Lm(g) =
{
arg min
x∈`m(y)
d∑
i=1
gixi
∣∣∣∀y s. t. d∑
i=1
giyi = g0
}
(17)
Then a group m agent with feature x can move to some y with f(y) = 1 and cm(y) − cm(x) ≤ 1
if and only if x ≥ ` for some ` ∈ Lm(g).
By definition, for any two `1, `2 ∈ Lm(g),∑
i=1
gi`1,i =
∑
i=1
gi`2,i = g0 − gkm
cm,km
,
where km ∈ arg maxi=[d] gicm,i . Thus a learner who cares only about the true label of presented
features, will construct her decision boundary g such that all ` ∈ Lm(g) have the same true label.
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A cost-minimizing learner who publishes a classifier f based on a hyperplane g on manipu-
lated features will commit errors on those candidates with unmanipulated features x ∈ [0, 1]d
contained within the boundaries given by LA(g) and LB(g). This space can be understood as the
d-dimensional generalization of the [`A(σ), `B(σ)] error interval in one-dimension.
Proposition 4 (Learner’s Cost in d Dimensions). A learner who publishes an undominated clas-
sifier f based on a hyperplane gᵀx = g0 can only commit false positives on group A candidates and
false negatives on group B candidates. The cost of such a classifier is
CFNPx∼DB
[
x ∈ (gᵀx < g0 − gkB
ckB
⋂
wᵀBx ≥ τB
)]
+ CFPPx∼DA
[
x ∈ (wᵀAx < τA⋂ gᵀx ≥ g0 − gkAckA )
]
,
where kB ∈ arg maxi∈[d] gicB,i and kA ∈ arg maxi∈[d]
gi
cA,i
.
4 Learner Subsidy Strategies
Since in our setting, the learner’s classification errors are directly tied to unequal group costs,
we ask whether she would be willing to subsidize group B candidates in order to shrink the
manipulation gap between the two groups and as a result, reduce the number of errors she commits.
In this section, we formalize subsidies as interventions that a learner can undertake to improve
her classification performance. Although in many high-stakes classification settings, the barriers
that make manipulation differentially accessible are non-monetary—such as time, information, and
social access—in this section, we consider subsidies that are monetary in nature to alleviate the
financial burdens of manipulation.
We introduce these subsidies for the purpose of analyzing their effects on not only the learner’s
classification performance but also candidate groups’ outcomes. Since subsidies mitigate the in-
herent disparities in groups’ costs and increase access to manipulation, one might expect that their
implementation would surely improve group B’s overall welfare. In this section, we show that in
some cases, optimal subsidy interventions can surprisingly have the effect of lowering the welfare
of candidates from both groups without improving the welfare of even a single candidate.
4.1 Subsidy Formalization
There are different ways in which a learner might choose to subsidize candidates costs. In the main
text of this paper, we focus on subsidies that reduce each group B candidate’s costs such that the
agent need only pay a β fraction of her original manipulation cost.
Definition 4 (Proportional subsidy). Under a proportional subsidy plan, the learner pays a pro-
portion 1 − β of each group B candidate’s cost of manipulation for some β ∈ [0, 1]. As such, a
group B candidate who manipulates from an initial feature vector x to a final feature vector y bears
a cost of β
(
cB(y)− cB(x)
)
.
In the appendix, we also introduce flat subsidies in which the learner absorbs up to a flat α
amount from each group B candidate’s costs, leaving the candidate to pay max{0, cB(y)−cB(x)−
α}. Similar results to those shown in this section hold for flat subsidies.
When considering proportional subsidies, the learner’s strategy now consists of both a choice
of β and a choice of classifier f to issue. The learner’s goal is to minimize her penalty
CFP
∑
m∈{A,B}
pmPx∼Dm
[
hm(x) = 0, f(y) = 1
]
+ CFN
∑
m∈{A,B}
pmPx∼Dm
[
hm(x) = 1, f(y) = 0
]
+ λcost(f, β),
where cost(f, β) is the monetary cost of the subsidy, CFP and CFN denote the cost of a false
positive and a false negative respectively as before, and λ ≥ 0 is some constant that determines
the relative weight of misclassification errors and subsidy costs for the learner.
For ease of exposition, the remainder of the section is presented in terms of one-dimensional
features. In Section A.3.1 of the appendix, we show that in many cases, the d-dimensional linear
costs setting can be reduced to this one-dimensional setting.
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As an analog of (7), we define `βB(y) = (βcB)
−1(βcB(y)−1), giving the minimum corresponding
unmanipulated feature x for any observed feature y. Under the proportional subsidy, for a given
y, the group B candidate must have x ≥ `βB(y). From this, we define σβB such that `βB(σβB) = τB .
In order to compute the cost of a subsidy plan, we must determine the number of group B
candidates who will take advantage of a given subsidy benefit. Since manipulation brings no benefit
in itself, candidates will only choose to manipulate and use the subsidy if it will lead to a positive
classification. For a published classifier f with threshold σ, we then have
cost(f, β) =
(
1− β) ∫ σ
`βB(σ)
(
cB(σ)− cB(x)
)
Px∼DB (x)dx.
Although the learner’s optimization problem can be solved analytically for various values of λ,
we are primarily interested in taking a welfare-based perspective on the effects of various classifi-
cation regimes on both the learner and candidate groups. In the following section, we analyze how
the implementation of a subsidy plan can alter a learner’s classification strategy and consider the
potential impacts of such policies on candidate groups.
4.2 Group Welfare Under Subsidy Plans
While a learner would choose to adopt a subsidy strategy primarily in order to reduce her error
rate, offering cost subsidies can also be seen as an intervention that might equalize opportunities
in an environment that by default favors those who face lower costs. That is, if costs are keeping
group B down, then one might believe that reducing costs will surely allow group B a fairer
shot at manipulation, and, as a result, a fairer shot at positive classification. Alas we find that
mitigating cost disparities by way of subsidies does not necessarily lead to better outcomes for
group B candidates. In fact, an optimal subsidy plan can actually reduce the welfares of both
groups. Paradoxically, in some cases, the subsidy plan boosts only the learner’s utility, whereas
every individual candidate from both groups would have preferred that she offer no subsidies at
all.
The following theorem captures the surprising result that subsidies can be harmful to all can-
didates, even those from the group that would appear to benefit.
Theorem 2 (Subsidies can harm both groups). There exist cost functions cA and cB satisfying
the cost conditions, learner distributions DA and DB, true classifiers with threshold τA and τB,
population proportions pA and pB, and learner penalty parameters CFN , CFP , and λ, such that no
candidate in either group has higher payoff at the equilibrium of the Strategic Classification Game
with proportional subsidies compared with the equilibrium of the Strategic Classification Game with
no subsidies, and some candidates from both group A and group B are strictly worse off.
We note that a slightly weaker version of the theorem holds for flat subsidies. In particular,
there exist cases in which some individual candidates have higher payoff at the equilibrium of the
Strategic Classification Game with flat subsidies compared with the equilibrium with no subsidies,
but both group A and group B candidates have lower payoffs on average with the subsidies.
To prove the theorem, it suffices to give a single case in which both candidate groups are
harmed by the use of subsidies. However, to illustrate that this phenomenon does not arise only
as a rare corner case, we provide one such example here plus two in the appendix, and discuss
general conditions under which this occurs. In each example, we consider a particular instance of
the Strategic Classification Game and compare the welfares of candidates at equilibrium when the
learner is able to select a proportional subsidy with their welfares at equilibrium when no subsidy
is allowed.
Example 1. Suppose that a learner is error-minimizing such that CFN = CFP = 1 and λ =
3
4 .
Suppose that unmanipulated features for both groups are uniformly distributed with pA = pB =
1
2 .
Let group cost functions be given by cA(x) = 8
√
x + x and cB(x) = 12
√
x; note that the cost
condition c′A(x) < c
′
B(x) holds for x ∈ [0, 1]. Let the true group thresholds be given by τA = 0.4
and τB = 0.3.
When subsidies are not allowed, the learner chooses a classifier with threshold σ∗ = σB ≈ 0.398
at equilibrium. This threshold perfectly classifies all candidates from group B, while permitting
false positives on candidates from group A with features x ∈ [0.272, 0.4).
If the learner decides to implement a proportional subsidies plan, at equilibrium the learner
chooses a classifier with threshold σ∗prop = σA ≈ 0.546 and a subsidy parameter β∗ = 0.558. Her
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new threshold now correctly classifies all members of group A, while committing false negatives on
group B members with features x ∈ [0.3, 0.348).
Some candidates in group B are thus strictly worse-off, while none improve. Without the subsidy
offering, group B members had been perfectly classified, but now there exist some candidates who are
mistakenly excluded. Further, one can show that candidates who are positively classified must pay
more to manipulate to the new threshold in spite of receiving the subsidy benefit. This increased cost
is due to the fact that the higher classification threshold imposes greater burdens on manipulation
than the β subsidy alleviates.
Group A candidates are also strictly worse-off since the threshold increase eliminates false
positive benefits that some members had previously been granted in the no-subsidy regime. Moreover,
all candidates who manipulate must expend more to do so, since these candidates do not receive
a subsidy payment. Only the learner is strictly better off with the implementation of this subsidy
plan.
Additional examples in the appendix show cases in which both groups experience diminished
welfare when they bear linear costs. Even when the learner has an error function that penalizes
false negatives twice as harshly as false positives and thus is explicitly concerned with mistakenly
excluding group B candidates, an equilibrium subsidy strategy can still make both groups worse-off.
We thus highlight two consequences of subsidy interventions: On the one hand, with reduced
cost burdens, more candidates from the disadvantaged group should be able to manipulate to reach
a positive classification. However, subsidy payments also allow a learner to select a classifier that
is at least as strict as the one issued without offering subsidies. These are opposing forces, and
these examples show that without needing to distort underlying group probability distributions or
the learner’s penalty function in extreme ways, the effect of mitigating manipulation costs may be
outweighed by the overall impact of a stricter classifier.
This result can also be extended to show that a setup in which candidates are unable to
manipulate their features at all can be preferred by all three parties—groups A and B as well as
the learner—to both the manipulation and subsidy regimes. We provide an informal statement of
this proposition below and defer the interested reader to its formal statement and demonstration
in the appendix.
Proposition 5. There exist general cost functions such that the outcomes issued by a learner’s
equilibrium classifier under a non-manipulation regime is preferred by all parties—the learner,
group A, and group B—to outcomes that arise both under her equilibrium manipulation classifier
and under her equilibrium subsidy strategy.
5 Discussion
Social stratification is constituted by forms of privilege that exist along many different axes, weav-
ing and overlapping to create an elaborate mesh of power relations. While our model of strategic
manipulation does not attempt to capture this irreducible complexity, we believe this work high-
lights a likely consequence of the expansion of algorithmic decision-making in a world that is
marked by deep social inequalities. We demonstrate that the design of classification systems can
grant undue rewards to those who appear more meritorious under a particular conception of merit
while justifying exclusions of those who have failed to meet those standards. These consequences
serve to exacerbate existing inequalities.
Our work also shows that attempts to resolve these negative social repercussions of classifica-
tion, such as implementing policies that help disadvantaged populations manipulate their features
more easily, may actually have the opposite effect. A learner who has offered to mitigate the costs
facing these candidates may be encouraged to set a higher classification standard, underestimat-
ing the deeper disadvantages that a group encounters, and thus serving to further exclude these
populations. However, it is important to note that these unintended consequences do not always
arise. A conscientious learner who offers subsidies to equalize the playing field can guard against
such paradoxes by making sure to classify agents in the same way even when offering to mitigate
costs.
Other research in signaling and strategic classification has considered models in which manipu-
lation is desirable from the learner’s point of view [17, 26]. Though this perspective diverges from
the one we consider here, we acknowledge that there do exist cases in which manipulation serves to
improve a candidate’s quality and thus leads a learner to encourage such behaviors. It is important
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to note, however, that although this account may accurately represent some social classification
scenarios, differential group access to manipulation remains an issue, and in fact, cases in which
manipulation genuinely improves candidate quality may present even more problematic scenarios
for machine learning systems. As work in algorithmic fairness has shown, feedback effects of clas-
sification can lead to deepening inequalities that become “justified” on the basis of features both
manipulated and “natural” [27].
The rapid adoption of algorithmic tools in social spheres calls for a range of perspectives
and approaches that can address a variety of domain-specific concerns. Expertise from other
disciplines ought to be imported into machine learning, informing and infusing our research in
motivation, application, and technical content. As such, our work seeks to investigate, from a
theoretical learning perspective, some of the potential adverse effects of what sociology has called
“quantification,” a world increasingly governed by metrics. In doing so, we bring in techniques
from game theory and information economics to model the interaction between a classifier and its
subjects. This paper adopts a framework that tries to capture the genuine unfair aspects of our
social reality by modeling group inequality in a population of agents. Although this perspective
deviates from standard idealized settings of learner-agent interaction, we believe that so long
as machine learning tools are designed for deployment in the imperfect social world, pursuing
algorithmic fairness will require us to explicitly build models and theory to address critical issues
such as social stratification and unequal access.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs from Section 3.1
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first construct the optimal learner classifier when facing only candidates of a single group.
Suppose the learner encounters only group A candidates. Then using her knowledge that the true
classifier hA is based on a threshold τA ∈ [0, 1], she can construct a classifier that admits those
candidates with scores x ≥ τA and rejects candidates x < τA. Since the maximal manipulation
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cost that any candidate would be willing to undertake is 1, for all x ∈ [0, 1], cA(y)− cA(x) ≤ 1 and
therefore
y ≤ c−1A (cA(x) + 1)
Thus a candidate with feature x = τA would be able to move to any feature y ≤ σA where
σA = c
−1
A (cA(τA) + 1).
Repeating the same reasoning for group B, a candidate with feature x = τB would be willing
to move to any feature y ≤ σB where σB = c−1B (cB(τB) + 1).
Now we want to show that [σB , σA] marks an interval of undominated strategies. First we prove
the ordering that σB ≤ σA for all cost functions cB and cA and all thresholds τB ≤ τA. Recall
that since hA(x) = 1 =⇒ hB(x) = 1, we have τB ≤ τA. Although we cannot order cB(τB) and
cA(τA), we have, by monotonicity of cB
cB(τB) ≤ cB(τA).
Let ∆ = cB(τA)− cB(τB). Notice that if ∆ ≥ 1, cB(τB) + 1 ≤ cB(τA), and so
σB = c
−1
B (cB(τB) + 1) ≤ τA < σA,
where the last inequality is due to monotonicity of cA. X
Let us consider the ∆ ∈ (0, 1) case. By the cost condition, we can write c′B(τA) ≥ c′A(τA). This
implies that
c−1B (cB(τA) + 1) ≤ c−1A (cA(τA) + 1)
Substituting in cB(τA) = cB(τB) + ∆, we have
c−1B (cB(τB) + ∆ + 1) ≤ c−1A (cA(τA) + 1) = σA.
By monotonicity of cB , the left hand side is ≥ σB , and we have that σB ≤ σA as desired. X
Notice that for all σ < σB , the learner commits false positive errors on candidates from group
B, since σB is optimal for group B classification. She commits more false positives on group A
candidates as well and does not commit any fewer false negatives because of the monotonicity of
cB and cA. Thus for any error function with CFP > 0, the threshold classifier σB dominates σ.
Similarly, for all σ > σA, the learner commits false negative errors on candidates from group A,
since σA is optimal for group A classification. She also commits more false negatives on group B
while committing no fewer false positives. Thus for any error function with CFN > 0, the threshold
classifier σA dominates σ.
For all σ ∈ [σB , σA], the learner trades off false negatives on group B for false positives on
group A, and we call this range of threshold strategies undominated.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We compute the cost of a learner’s threshold strategy σ ∈ [σB , σA] by first examining its perfor-
mance on each group individually.
Recall from Proposition 1 that the optimal learner threshold that perfectly classifies all B
candidates is σB . Thus for all threshold strategies based on σ ∈ (σB , σA], the learner commits
false negative errors on group B.
To compute which members of group B are subject to these errors, consider a learner classifier
f based on a threshold σ. In order to manipulate to reach the feature threshold σ, a group B
candidate must have an unmanipulated x such that
cB(σ)− cB(x) ≤ 1,
x ≥ c−1B (cB(σ) + 1) = `B(σ).
We know that τB ≤ `B(σ) by monotonicity of cB , and thus for all group B candidates with feature
x ∈ [τB , `B(σ)), the learner issues classification f(x) = 0, even though hB(x) = 1. These are the
false negative errors issued on group B for which the learner bears cost
CFNpBPx∼DB
[
x ∈ [τB , `B(σ))
]
(18)
Following the same reasoning, notice that since σA is the optimal threshold policy for a learner
facing only group A candidates, a classifier f based on any σ ∈ [σB , σA) commits false positive
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errors on some group A candidates. Then repeating the steps that we carried out for group B, we
see that for all group A candidates with x such that
x ≥ c−1A (cA(σ) + 1 = `A(σ)
the classifier f issues a positive classification; f(x) = 1. Since `A(σ) ≤ τA, candidates with features
x ∈ [`A(σ), τA), have true label hA(x) = 0, and the learner commits false positive errors that bear
cost
CFP pAPx∼DA
[
x ∈ [`A(σ), τA)
]
(19)
Combining (18) and (19), the total cost of any classifier f based on a threshold σ ∈ [σB , σA], we
obtain our desired result.
A.1.3 Proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2
These results follow by considering strategies σB , which commits no errors on group B and thus
only bears the cost given in (19), and σA, which commits no errors on group A and thus only bears
the cost given in (18).
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Under the assumption of uniform feature distributions for both groups, minimizing a classifier’s
probability of error amounts to choosing the threshold σ as
arg min
σ∈[σB ,σA]
`B(σ)− `A(σ).
With proportional group costs cA(x) = qcB(x) for q ∈ (0, 1), we have that
`′B(σ) =
(cB)
′(σ)(
cB
)′((
cB
)−1(
cB(σ)− 1
))
=
(cB)
′(σ)(
cB
)′(
`B(σ)
)
and
`′A(σ) =
(cA)
′(σ)(
cA
)′((
cA
)−1(
cA(σ)− 1
))
=
(qcB)
′(σ)(
qcB
)′((
cA
)−1(
cA(σ)− 1
))
=
(cB)
′(σ)(
cB
)′((
cA
)−1(
cA(σ)− 1
))
=
(cB)
′(σ)(
cB
)′(
`A(σ)
) .
When cA and cB are strictly concave, since `B(σ) > `A(σ), (cB)
′(`A(σ)) > (cB)′(`B(σ)) and
therefore `′A(σ) < `
′
B(σ) for all σ ∈ [σB , σA], and the quantity `B(σ) − `A(σ) is monotonically
increasing in σ. Thus the optimal classifier threshold is σ∗ = σB .
Similarly, when cA and cB are strictly convex, `
′
A(σ) > `
′
B(σ) for all σ ∈ [σB , σA], and the
quantity `B(σ) − `A(σ) is monotonically decreasing in σ. Thus the optimal classifier threshold is
σ∗ = σA. Thus the optimal classifier threshold is σ∗ = σA.
Finally, when cA and cB are affine, `
′
A(σ) = `
′
B(σ) for all σ ∈ [σB , σA], and the quantity
`B(σ)−`A(σ) is constant for all σ ∈ [σB , σA]. Thus the learner is indifferent between all thresholds
σ ∈ [σB , σA].
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A.2 Proofs from Section 3.2
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a candidate with unmanipulated feature x ∈ [0, 1]d and manipulation cost ∑di=1 cixi who
faces a classifier f(y) with linear decision boundary given by
∑d
i=1 giyi = g0. Recall that the
utility a candidate receives for presenting feature y ≥ x is given by f(y)−c(x,y). When f(x) = 1,
it is trivial that the candidate’s best response to select y = x. X
Notice that if for all i ∈ [d], f(x + 1ci ei) = 0, then we have that gᵀx +
gk
ck
< g0, so
ck(g0 − gᵀx)
gk
> 1
The manipulation from x to y = x +
∑
i∈K
ti
ci
ei such that g
ᵀy = g0 entails cost
c(y)− c(x) =
∑
i∈K
ti =
ck(g0 − gᵀx)
gk
> 1
and manipulating to achieve a positive classification using only components in K would require a
cost > 1. By definition, keeping the sum
∑
i∈K ti, but selecting different ti such that some i /∈ K,
ti > 0 would yield an even lower value g
ᵀx +
∑d
i=1
giti
ci
.
Thus manipulating from x to y such that f(y) = 1 entails a cost c(y) − c(x) > 1, and the
candidate would not move at all, since the utility for moving 1 − (c(y) − c(x)) < 0 makes her
worse-off than being subject to a negative classification without expending any cost on feature
manipulation. Thus she selects y = x. X
Now we consider the case where f(x) = 0 and there exists i ∈ [d] such that f(x + 1ci ei) = 1.
Let k ∈ K = arg maxi∈[d] gici . We prove that the best-response manipulation for candidates
with these x moves to
y = x +
d∑
i=1
ti
ci
ei (20)
where ti ≥ 0, tj = 0 for all j /∈ K, and gᵀ(x +
∑
i∈K
ti
ci
ei) = g0. Note that such a y may
not be unique—there may be multiple best-response manipulated features that achieve the same
candidate utility, since they all result in the same candidate cost, and thus regardless of choices
i ∈ K, we have that ∑
i∈K
ti =
ck(g0 − gᵀx)
gk
(21)
The utility of any move to y satisfying (20) is given by
f(y∗)− c(x,y∗) = 1−
∑
i=1
ti
Let us pick any such y and call it y∗ since we will show that all other manipulations that are not
of the form given in (20) generate lower utility for the candidate than y∗.
We now show that for any manipulation to y,
∑d
i=1 ti ≤ 1. By assumption, for some i, we have
f(x +
1
ci
ei) = 1 =⇒ gᵀx + gi
ci
≥ g0
Thus by (21), we have that
∑
i∈K ti ≤
ck
gi
ci
gk
. By definition of k, this is at most one since gkck ≥
gi
ci
for all i ∈ [d]. X
Suppose on the contrary that there exists another manipulated feature yˆ 6= y∗ that is optimal
and is not of the form (20):
f(yˆ)− (c(yˆ)− c(x)) ≥ 1− ck(g0 − g
ᵀx)
gk
≥ 0
19
Then it must be the case that moving to yˆ achieves a positive classification with a lower cost
burden. We write
yˆ = x +
∑
i=1
tˆiei
where ei is the i
th standard basis vector, and tˆj = yˆj − xj to highlight the components that have
been manipulated from x to yˆ.
First, we suppose that yˆ is such that there exists some component yˆj > 0 where j /∈ K =
arg maxi∈[d]
gi
ci
. Now we construct a feature yˆ′ by selecting this component, and decreasing tˆj = 0
and increasing a component k ∈ K by cj tˆjck . That is
yˆ′ = yˆ − tˆjej + cj tˆj
ck
ek
The cost of manipulation from x to yˆ′ is the same as that for manipulation to yˆ:
c(yˆ′)− c(x) =
d∑
i=1
ciyˆi − tˆjcj + ck cj tˆj
ck
=
d∑
i=1
ciyˆi
Notice that now we have
d∑
i=1
giyˆ
′
i =
d∑
i=1
giyˆi − gj tˆj + gkcj tˆj
ck
>
d∑
i=1
giyˆi ≥ g0.
Thus the candidate can manipulate to yˆ′ by expending the same cost with
d∑
i=1
giyˆ
′
i > g0
Then by continuity of g, there must exist some y¯ ≤ yˆ′ such that ∑di=1 giy¯i ∈ [g0,∑di=1 giyˆ′i). Thus
since costs are monotonically increasing, c(x, y¯) < c(x, yˆ) and since y¯ reaches the same classifica-
tion, and we have shown that yˆ could not have been optimal, which is a contradiction. X
Now we consider the case where yˆ = x +
∑d
i=1 tˆiei is such that tˆj = 0 for all j /∈ K, but
gᵀyˆ 6= g0. If gᵀyˆ < g0, then yˆ is negatively classified and thus trivially receives a lower utility
than manipulating to any feature y that is positively classified and associated with total cost∑
i ti ≤ 1.
If gᵀyˆ > g0, then there are two possibilities: If c(yˆ) − c(x) ≥ 1, then once again, she receives
at most a utility of 0, and thus manipulating to yˆ is a suboptimal move. If c(yˆ)− c(x) < 1, then
we show the optimal manipulation is the one that moves from x to
y = x +
∑
i=1
tiei
where gᵀy = g0 and tj = 0, ∀j /∈ K—the move dictated by (20). This feature y also achieves a
positive classification, but we argue that it does so at a lower cost than yˆ. Since gᵀyˆ > g0, we can
define
∆ = gᵀyˆ − g0 > 0
The manipulation from x to yˆ − ∆gk ek for any choice of k attains a higher utility since it receives
the same classification since
gᵀ(yˆ − ∆
ck
ek) = g0
but does so at a cost
c(y)− c(x) = c(yˆ)− c(x)−∆
Since we already showed that all manipulations to y of the form given in (20) bear the same
cost, then we have shown that all such y are preferable to yˆ. By monotonicity of c(y)− c(x) and∑d
i=1 gixi, all manipulations with lower cost entail a negative classification and thus a lower utility,
and such only those manipulations to y are optimal.
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A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove that a learner who has access to the linear decision boundary for the true classifier
can construct a classifier that commits no errors on any candidates from a single group; thus, in
our setting, perfect classifiers exist for groups A and B. We then prove that all undominated
classifiers commit no false positives on group B and no false negatives on group A.
Suppose true classifiers are given by hA and hB based on decision boundaries
∑d
i=1 wA,ixi = τA
and
∑d
i=1 wB,ixi = τB , costs are cA(x) =
∑d
i=1 cA,ixi and cB(x) =
∑d
i=1 cB,ixi.
Claim 1: When facing candidates from a single group, a learner who has access to true decision
boundary
∑d
i=1 wixi = τ and manipulation costs
∑d
i=1 cixi can construct a perfect classifier.
Proof. Consider those features x¯ ∈ [0, 1]d that lie on the true decision boundary ∑di=1 wixi = τ
and thus have true labels 1. For each of these x¯, we construct ∆(x¯) as defined in (12) to represent
the candidate’s space of potential manipulation to form the set {∆(x¯)} for all x¯ on the boundary.
Notice that when all candidates face the same cost, the set of jth vertices of each of the simplices
∆(x¯), given by vj(x¯) = x¯ +
1
cj
ej , are coplanar. Each of these hyperplanes can be described as a
set {
y :
d∑
i=1
wiyi = τ +
wj
cj
}
.
Let k ∈ arg maxj wjcj . We define g1 to be a notational shortcut for the hyperplane corresponding
to feature k, so
g1 =
y :
d∑
j=1
g1,jyj = g1,0
 ,
where g1,0 = τ +
wk
ck
and g1,i = wi for all i ∈ {1, ..., d}. We define a classifier f1 based on the
hyperplane g1:
f1(y) =
{
1
∑d
j=1 g1,jyj ≥ g1,0,
0
∑d
j=1 g1,jyj < g1,0.
(22)
To show that f1 is a perfect classifier of all candidates with these generic costs, we show that it
commits no false positive errors and no false negative errors. Notice that since g1 was constructed
to be precisely the hyperplane that contains all vertices vk(x¯) = x¯ +
1
ck
of the simplices ∆(x¯)
where k ∈ arg maxj∈[d] wjcj , then all x¯ on the true decision boundary
∑d
i=1 wixi = τ can indeed
manipulate to vk(x¯) and reach g1 to gain a positive classification.
Similarly, all candidates with features x such that
∑d
i=1 wixi > τ , can move to the k
th vertex
of the simplex ∆(x) given by vk(x) = x +
1
ck
ek in order to be classified positively since
d∑
i=1
wivk,i(x) > τ +
wk
ck
=⇒
d∑
i=1
g1,jvk,i(x) > g1,0.
Thus f1 correctly classifies all these candidates positively and permits no false negatives. X
Consider the optimal manipulation for all true negative candidates x. By Lemma 1, the optimal
manipulation would be either to not move at all, guaranteeing a negative classification, or to move x
to some point y = x+
∑d
i=1
ti
ci
ei where tj = 0 for all j /∈ arg maxj∈[d] g1,jcj . But since
∑d
i=1 wixi < τ ,
then for all such y,
d∑
i=1
wiyi ≤
d∑
i=1
wixi +
wk
ck
< τ +
wk
ck
=⇒
d∑
i=1
g1,jyj < g1,0
and thus the classifier based on the hyperplane g1 also issues a classification f1(x) = 0 and admits
no false positives. X
Thus we have shown that the hyperplane g1 supports a perfect classifier f1 as defined in (22).
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Now we move on to group-specific claims, where groups have distinct costs and potentially dis-
tinct true decision boundaries, but we continue to use the constructions of f1 and g1 from Claim
1.
Claim 2: Let fA1 be the classifier based on boundary g1 for group A, and let f
B
1 be the
classifier based on boundary g1 for group B, as in (22), but with group-specific costs and true
decision boundary parameters. Then ∀y ∈ [0, 1]d,
fA1 (y) = 1 =⇒ fB1 (y) = 1.
Proof. We first prove the claim for the case in which hA = hB with decision bounday
∑d
i=1 wixi =
τ . We then show that it also holds when the two are not equal.
By the cost condition that cA(y) − cA(x) ≤ cB(y) − cB(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]d and y ≥ x, we
know that for any given x,
∆B(x) ⊆ ∆A(x).
Let kA ∈ arg maxj∈[d] wjcA,j and kB ∈ arg maxj∈[d]
wj
cB,j
, so that gA1 and g
B
1 are defined as
d∑
i=1
wiyi = τ +
wkA
cA,kA
⇐⇒ gA1 :
d∑
j=1
gA1,jyj = g
A
1,0,
d∑
i=1
wiyi = τ +
wkB
cB,kB
⇐⇒ gB1 :
d∑
j=1
gB1,jyj = g
B
1,0.
Then since for all i ∈ [d], cA,i ≤ cB,i, we must have that
τ +
wkA
cA,kA
≥ τ + wkB
cA,kB
≥ τ + wkB
cB,kB
,
and thus gA1,0 ≥ gB1,0. Since fA1 is the classifier based on gA1 and fB1 is based on gB1 , we have that
∀y ∈ [0, 1]d,
fA1 (y) = 1 =⇒ fB1 (y) = 1.
Now consider the case in which hA and hB differ. Recall the assumption hA(x) = 1 =⇒
hB(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]d. Thus for all x ∈ [0, 1]d,∑
i=1
wA,ixi ≥ τA =⇒
∑
i=1
wB,ixi ≥ τB . (23)
Recall that the hyperplanes gA1 , g
B
1 are constructed as shifts of
∑
i=1 wA,ixi ≥ τA and
∑
i=1 wB,ixi ≥
τB by the set of simplices {∆A(x¯A)} and {∆B(x¯B)} for x¯A such that
∑
i=1 wA,ix¯A,i = τA and x¯B
such that
∑
i=1 wB,ix¯B,i = τB . Since ∆B(x) ⊆ ∆A(x), gA1 and gB1 support classifiers fA1 and fB1
such that
fA1 (y) = 1 =⇒ fB1 (y) = 1.
Claim 3: All undominated classifiers commit no false negative errors on group A members
and no false positive errors on group B members when candidates best respond.
Proof. Fix a classifier f and consider a group A candidate with true feature vector x¯ who manip-
ulates to best response y¯ such that hA(x¯) = 1 but f(y¯) = 0. Thus the classifier f makes a false
negative error on this candidate. We show that we can construct another classifier fˆ that correctly
classifies x¯ under its optimal manipulation with respect to fˆ .
We prove that fˆ commits no more errors than does f and commits strictly fewer errors since
it commits no false negatives on group A candidates.
Construct the classifier fˆ such that
fˆ(y) =
{
1 f(y) = 1 or fA1 (y) = 1,
0 otherwise,
(24)
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where fA1 (y) is based on the boundary
∑
j=1 g
A
1,jyj = g
A
1,0.
We first argue that f and fˆ make exactly the same set of false positive errors.
Consider a potential false positive error that fˆ issues on a candidate with feature x from group
A. Such a candidate cannot manipulate to a feature y to “trick” classifier fA1 , since we have
shown in Claim 1 that fA1 perfectly classifies all group A candidates, and thus does not admit false
positives. Thus any potential false positive error must be due to f(y) = 1, in which case fˆ and f
issue the same false positive error.
Now we consider a potential false positive error that fˆ issues on a candidate with feature x
from group B. By Claim 2, fA1 (y) = 1 =⇒ fB1 (y) = 1, and thus we would have that the
candidate with feature x was able to manipulate to some feature y such that fB1 (y) = 1. But this
is a contradiction, since we know that fB1 commits no false positives on group B members, and
thus fA1 (y) does not commit false positives on group B. Thus if fˆ commits a false positive, then
it must be the case that f committed the same false positive.
Consider a potential false negative error that fˆ issues on a candidate with feature x from group
B. Then it must be the case that x can manipulate to some y such that both f(y) = 0 and
fA1 (y) = 0, and thus it be the case that f commits the same false negative.
Lastly, consider a potential false negative error on a candidate from group A. By claim 1, this
candidate must have been able to manipulate to some feature vector y such that fA1 (y) = 1, since
fA1 commits no errors on group A members. Thus when a candidate with unmanipulated feature x
can manipulate to some y such that fA1 (y) = 1 yet can only present a (possibly different) feature
y such that f(y) = 0, then fˆ correctly classifies this candidate positively, even when f does not.
Thus fˆ makes no false negative errors on group B.
Thus fˆ commits strictly fewer errors than f—none of which are false negatives on group A
members—and f is dominated by fˆ . X
The second half of the claim can be proved through an analogous argument.
Combining Claims 1 and 3, we conclude that we can construct perfect classifiers for group A
that commit only false negative errors on group B and perfect classifiers for group B that commit
only false positive errors on group A. fA1 and f
B
1 are examples of such classifiers, though they are
not unique.
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 2
=⇒ direction: Assume a group m candidate with feature x can move to y such that f(y) = 1
and cm(y)− cm(x) ≤ 1, we show that necessarily x ≥ ` for some ` ∈ Lm(g).
If x can move to y, then x ∈ ∆−1(y). By the definition of `m(y),x ≥ x¯ for some x¯ ∈ `m(y).
Then by monotonicity of g, we have that
d∑
i=1
gixi ≥
d∑
i=1
gix¯i ≥ min
x∈`m(y)
d∑
i=1
gixi
Thus x ≥ ` for some ` ∈ Lm(g). X
⇐= direction: Assume some group m candidate has feature x ≥ ` for some ` ∈ Lm(g). Then
she can move to some y such that f(y) = 1 and cm(y)− cm(x) ≤ 1.
If x ≥ ` for some ` ∈ Lm(g), then
d∑
i=1
gixi ≥
d∑
i=1
gi`i,
where ` ∈ ∆−1m (y) for some y such that
∑
i=1 giyi = g0 and f(y) = 1. Since ` is defined as
arg minx∈`m(y)
∑
i=1 gixi, then we have
d∑
i=1
gi`i =
d∑
i=1
(
giyi −max
ti
d∑
i=1
giti
cm,i
)
,
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where ti ≥ 0 and
∑
i=1 ti = 1 as shown before. Then substituting
∑d
i=1 giyi = g0, we have that∑
i=1
gi`i +
gkm
cm,km
= g0,
where km ∈ arg maxi=[d] gici . Since x ≥ `, x can also manipulate to some y with f(y) = 1, bearing
a cost ≤ 1.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 4
If a learner publishes an undominated classifier f , then by Theorem 1, the hyperplane g : gᵀx = g0
that supports this classifier can only commit inequality-reinforcing errors: only false positives on
group A members and only false negatives on group B members.
As proved in Lemma 2, the set Lm(g) determines the effective threshold on unmanipulated
features x for a candidate of group m. We have already shown that for any two `1, `2 ∈ Lm(g),∑
i=1
gi`1,i =
∑
i=1
gi`2,i = g0 − gkm
ckm
where km ∈ arg maxi=[d] gicm,i . For any ` ∈ LB(g), we have
d∑
i=1
gi`i +
gkB
cB,kB
= g0
Thus combining these results, those group B candidates with features x ∈ [0, 1]d in the intersection
gᵀx < g0 − gkB
cB,kB
⋂
wᵀBx ≥ τB
are classified as false negatives. For group A, we consider ` ∈ LA(g):
d∑
i=1
gi`i +
gkA
cA,kA
= g0
and thus group A candidates with features x ∈ [0, 1]d in the intersection
wᵀAx < τA
⋂
gᵀx ≥ g0 − gkA
cA,kA
are classified as false positives. Thus the cost publishing g is
CFNPx∼DB
[
x ∈ (gᵀx < g0 − gkB
ckB
⋂
wᵀBx ≥ τB
)]
+ CFPPx∼DA
[
x ∈ (wᵀAx < τA⋂ gᵀx ≥ g0 − gkAckA )]
A.3 Proofs from Section 4
A.3.1 Reduction from the d-dimensional setting to the one-dimensional setting
We first show that under certain conditions of a learner’s equilibrium classifier strategy, a d-
dimensional subsidy analysis is equivalent to a one-dimensional subsidy analysis.
In general d-dimensions, those features y attainable from an unmanipulated feature x ∈ [0, 1]d,
where f(x) = 0, is given by
y ≤ x +
d∑
i=1
ti
ci
ei where
d∑
i=1
ti = 1
where the right hand side gives the simplex ∆(x) of potential manipulation. By Lemma 1, if a
candidate moves from x to y 6= x, then she selects t such that tj = 0 for all j /∈ K = arg maxi=[d] gici .
Staying within the simplex implies
∑d
i=1 ti ≤ 1.
24
Increasing the candidate’s available cost to expend from 1 to n increases her range of motion
such that now she can move to any
y ≤ x +
d∑
i=1
ti
ci
ei where
d∑
i=1
ti = n
She continues to manipulate in the spirit of Lemma 1—optimal moves entail choices of t such that
tj = 0 for all j /∈ K—however now, she is willing to manipulate if ∃i ∈ [d] such that
f(x +
n
ci
ei) = 1
and thus chooses t such that
∑
i=1 ti ≤ n.
Since offering a subsidy does not change the form of the group B cost function, a candidate
from group B will pursue the same manipulation strategy given by the vector t under subsidy
regimes as long as the classifier’s decision boundaries stay the same. By definition, all such choices
of y resulting from a manipulation via t have equivalent values gᵀy.
When costs are subsidized through a flat α or a proportional β subsidy, a candidate with feature
x can manipulate to any yα,yβ ≥ x that satisfies
yα ∈ [x,x +
d∑
i=1
ti
ci
ei] where
d∑
i=1
ti = 1 + α (25)
yβ ∈ [x,x +
d∑
i=1
ti
ci
ei] where
d∑
i=1
ti =
1
β
(26)
We can pursue a dimensionality reduction by mapping each feature x ∈ [0, 1]d to gᵀx ∈ R+.
Rather than considering an optimal manipulation in d-dimensions from x to y, we instead consider
the relationship between the cost of the manipulation and the change from gᵀx to gᵀy:
d∑
i=1
ci(yi − xi) ⇐⇒
d∑
i=1
gi(yi − xi)
where gi gives the coefficients of the linear decision boundary that supports f , and x optimally
manipulates to y. We want to show that such a relationship is linear.
Consider optimal manipulations: If a candidate chooses not to manipulate at all, she will incur
a cost of 0 and will also move from
∑d
i=1 gi(yi − xi) = 0. Since optimal manipulations (under any
“budget” constraint) only are along kth components, a move from x to y always entails a total
cost of
d∑
i∈K
ci(yi − xi)
accompanied with
d∑
i∈K
gi(yi − xi) = gᵀ(y − x)
Thus we can write her total cost c for a move from x to y as
ck
gk
(gᵀy − gᵀx) (27)
for any k ∈ K. Recall that by Lemma 1, optimal non-stationary manipulations move from x to
y > x such that
∑d
i=1 giyi = g0, so in these cases, we can also write the above as
ck
gk
(g0 − gᵀx)
Thus we can consider candidates’ unmanipulated d-dimensional features x as one-dimensional
features gᵀx and classifiers f based on d-dimensional hyperplanes g :
∑d
i=1 gixi = g0 as imposing
one-dimensional thresholds g0.
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However a learner may also choose a different optimal subsidy strategy, thus publishing a
classifier that now admits candidates differently. Formally, suppose a learner first publishes a
classifier f1 based on a decision boundary g1 :
∑d
i=1 g1,ixi = g1,0 to which a candidate’s optimal
response follows the form given in Lemma 1 with k1 ∈ arg maxi∈[d] g1,ici . If a learner then chooses
to change her strategy when implementing a subsidy, thus publishing a different classifier f2 based
on decision boundary g2 :
∑d
i=1 g2,ixi = g2,0, a candidate’s optimal manipulation strategy will
continue to adhere to Lemma 1, however, now, k2 ∈ arg maxi∈[d] g2,ici . Whereas the corresponding
one-dimensional cost function c(y)− c(x) for best-response manipulations when facing classifier f1
was given by
ck1
g1,k1
(gᵀ1 (y − x))
Her corresponding cost function when facing classifier f2 is
ck2
g2,k2
(gᵀ2 (y − x))
When these cost functions are the same, as when the coefficients g1,i = g2,i for all i, the agent’s
strategies when facing f1 and f2 are identical when reduced to one-dimension. This case arises, for
example, when the learner continues to perfectly classify a single group in both the non-subsidy
regime and the subsidy regime. In these cases, we can transition to considering just one-dimensional
manipulations from gᵀy to gᵀx, where candidates bear linear costs of manipulation given in (27).
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Working from the subsidy and no-subsidy comparisons given in Proposition 2, we show that all
three parties would have preferred the outcomes of a non-manipulation world to those in both of
the manipulation cases.
To facilitate comparisons of welfare across classification regimes, we formalize group-wide util-
ities in the following definition.
Definition 5 (Group welfare under a proportional subsidy). The average welfare of group B under
classifier fprop and a proportional subsidy with parameter β is given by
WB(fprop, β) =
∫
R1
Px∼DB (x)dx
+
∫
R2
(
1− β(cB(y(x))− cB(x))
)
Px∼DB (x)dx,
WA(fprop, 1) =
∫
R1
Px∼DA(x)dx
+
∫
R2
(
1− (cA(y(x))− cA(x))
)
Px∼DA(x)dx,
where y(x) is the best response of a candidate with unmanipulated feature x, R1 sums over those
candidates who are positively classified by fprop without expending any cost, and R2 sums over those
candidates who are positively classified after manipulating their features. Since group A members do
not receive subsidy benefits, their welfare form is the same across no-subsidy and subsidy regimes.
We use WA(fprop) to denote WA(fprop, 1), the average welfare for group A under classifier
fprop with no subsidy.
Definition 6 (Group welfare in a non-manipulation setting). The average welfare of group m
under classifier f0 in a non-manipulation setting is given by
Wm(f0) =
∫
R
Px∼Dm(x)dx
where R sums over candidates who are positively classified by f0.
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Proposition 6. There exist cost functions cA and cB satisfying the cost conditions, learner dis-
tributions DA and DB, true classifiers with threshold τA and τB, population proportions pA and
pB, and learner penalty parameters CFN , CFP , and λ, such that
WA(f
∗
prop) < WA(f
∗
0 ), WB(f
∗
prop, β
∗) < WB(f∗0 ),
WA(f
∗
1 ) < WA(f
∗
0 ), WB(f
∗
1 ) < WB(f
∗
0 ),
C(f∗prop, β
∗) > C(f∗0 ), C(f
∗
1 ) > C(f
∗
0 )
where f0 is the equilibrium classifier in the non-manipulation regime, f
∗
1 is the equilibrium classifier
in the manipulation regime, and (f∗prop, β
∗) is the equilibrium classifier in the subsidy regime. The
average welfare of each group, Wm(·), as well as the learner, 1−C(·), is higher at the equilibrium
of the non-manipulation game compared with the equilibria of the Strategic Classification Game
with proportional subsidies and compared with the equilibrium of the Strategic Classification Game
with no subsidies.
Example 2. Now we consider a case in which candidates have linear cost functions cA(x) = 3x and
cB(x) = 4x. To show that diminished welfare for both candidate groups can occur without requiring
distortions of probability distributions or cost functions, we consider a learner who seeks to avoid
errors on group B in both the subsidy and the non-subsidy regimes by penalizing false negatives
twice as much as false positives, with CFN =
2
3 , CFP =
1
3 , and λ =
3
4 . As in the previous example,
we assume that the underlying unmanipulated features for both groups are uniformly distributed
with pA = pB =
1
2 , and that τA = 0.4 and τB = 0.3.
Now the equilibrium learner classifier without subsidies is based on threshold σ∗1 = σB = 0.55,
which perfectly classifies all candidates from group B, while permitting false positives on candidates
from group A with features x ∈ [0.217, 0.4). Under a proportional subsidy intervention, the learner’s
equilibrium action is to choose threshold σ∗prop = σ
β
B ≈ 0.552 and β∗ = 0.994, which again perfectly
classifies B candidates. Notice that now her optimal threshold commits fewer false positive errors
on group A members, while still committing false positives on those members with features x ∈
[0.219, 0.4).
Here, even when the learner has a cost penalty that is explicitly concerned with mistakenly
excluding group B candidates and then seeks to offer a subsidy benefit to further alleviate their
costs, group B members are still no better off. They receive the same classifications as before and
it can be shown that all candidates who manipulate must spend more to reach the higher threshold,
even while accounting for the subsidy benefit! Some group A candidates are also worse off since
the threshold has increased, and they receive no subsidy benefits. As before, only the learner gains
from the intervention.
Example 3. This example is based on Example 2. Now we consider the case a learner seeks
σ∗1 ∈ [σB , σA] where σA = 0.733 and σB = 0.55. Suppose she seeks to equalize the number of false
positives she commits on group A and the number of false negatives for group B and thus chooses
σ∗1 = 0.64 such that
`A(σ
∗
1) = 0.31
`B(σ
∗
1) = 0.39
Thus group B candidates with features x ∈ [0.3, 0.39) are mistakenly excluded, and group A candi-
dates with features x ∈ [0.31, 0.4) are mistakenly admitted.
Upon implementing a subsidy and minimizing the same error penalty as in Example 1, the
learner selects an optimal proportional β subsidy such that
σ∗prop = σA = 0.733;β = 0.806
Under this regime, group B members are worse-off because many more candidates now receive false
negative classifications
x ∈ [0.3, 0.423)
Others who do secure positive classifications must pay more to do so. Candidates in group A are
now perfectly classified, though this actually entails a welfare decline, since some candidates lose
their false positive benefits. The learner is also strictly better off with a total penalty decline
C(σ∗0) = 0.183→ C(σ∗prop, β∗) = 0.128
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Recall that the learner’s utility is given by 1− C(·). Thus we have that
WA(σ
∗
prop, β
∗) < WA(σ∗1)
WB(σ
∗
prop, β
∗) < WB(σ∗1)
C(σ∗1) > C(σ
∗
prop, β
∗)
Now consider a non-manipulation regime, in which the learner selects to equalize the number of
false negatives for group B and the number of false positives for group A, she now chooses a
threshold on unmanipulated features
σ∗0 = 0.35
Some group A candidates lose false positive benefits in the manipulation regime, though on the
whole, the group fares better off because all those candidates with features
x ∈ [0.39, 0.64)
need not expend any costs in order to receive a positive classification. Group B candidates are
strictly better off since they both receive fewer false negatives and need not pay to manipulate. The
learner is also better off here because she reduces her error down to C(τ∗) = 0.1. Thus comparing
the non-manipulation regime, the no-subsidy manipulation regime, and the subsidy regime, we have
that utility comparisons for all three parties is given by
WA(σ
∗
0) > WA(σ
∗
1) > WA(σ
∗
prop, β
∗)
WB(σ
∗
0) > WB(σ
∗
1) > WB(σ
∗
prop, β
∗)
1− C(σ∗0) > 1− C(σ∗prop, β∗) > 1− C(σ∗1)
A.4 Flat Subsidies
Here we give analogous definitions and results for flat subsidies in which the learner absorbs up to
a flat α amount from each group B candidate’s costs and show that qualitatively similar results
hold.
Definition 7 (Flat subsidy). Under a flat subsidy plan, the learner pays an α > 0 benefit to all
members of group B. As such, a group B candidate who manipulates from an initial score x to a
final score y ≥ x bears a cost of max{0, cB(y)− cB(x)− α}.
A learner’s strategy now consists of both a choice of α and a choice of classifier f to issue. The
learner’s goal is to minimize her penalty
CFP
∑
m∈{A,B}
pmPx∼Dm [hm(x) = 0, f(y) = 1]
+ CFN
∑
m∈{A,B}
pmPx∼Dm [hm(x) = 1, f(y) = 0]
+ λcost(f, α),
We can define
`αB(y) = c
−1
B
(
cB(y)− (1 + α)
)
.
Under the α subsidy, for an observed feature y, the group B candidate must have unmanipulated
feature x ≥ `αB(y).
From these functions, we define σαB and σ
β
B such that `
α
B(σ
α
B) = τB , and `
β
B(σ
β
B) = τB . Under
a flat α subsidy, setting a threshold at σαB correctly classifies all group B members; under a
proportional β subsidy, a threshold at σβB correctly classifies all group B members.
From this, we define σαB such that `
α
B(σ
α
B) = τB . Under a flat α subsidy, setting a threshold at
σαB correctly classifies all group B members.
In order to compute the cost of a subsidy plan, we must determine the number of group B
candidates who will take advantage of a given subsidy benefit. Since manipulation brings no
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benefit in itself, candidates will still only choose to manipulate and use the subsidy if it will lead
to a positive classification. For the flat α subsidy, cost(f, α) is given by∫ σ
c−1B (cB(σ)−α)
[cB(σ)− cB(x)]PDB (x)dx+ α
∫ c−1B (cB(σ)−α)
`αB(σ)
PDB (x)dx,
where σ is the threshold for classifier f . The first integral refers to the benefits paid out to
candidates with manipulation costs less than the α amount offered. The latter refers to the total
sum of full α payments offered to those with costs greater than α.
Definition 8 (Group welfare under a flat subsidy). The average welfare of group B under classifier
f and a flat subsidy with parameter α is given by
WB(f, α) =
∫
R1
Px∼DB (x)dx
+
∫
R2
(1− cB(y(x)− cB(x)))Px∼DB (x)dx
where y(x) is the best response of a candidate with unmanipulated feature x, R1 sums over those
candidates who are positively classified without expending any cost, and R2 sums over those can-
didates who are positively classified after manipulating their features. Note that under the flat
subsidy, group B costs have the form max{0, cB(y)− cB(x)−α} The formulation of average group
A welfare is the same in this setting and follows the same form given in Definition 5.
Theorem 3 (Subsidies can harm both groups). There exist cost functions cA and cB satisfying
the cost conditions, learner distributions DA and DB, true classifiers with threshold τA and τB,
population proportions pA and pB, and learner penalty parameters CFN , CFP , and λ, such that
WA(f
∗
prop) < WA(f
∗
0 ), WB(f
∗
prop, α
∗) < WB(f∗0 ),
where f∗prop and α
∗ are the learner’s equilibrium classifier and subsidy choice in the Strategic
Classification Game with flat subsidies and f∗0 is the learner’s equilibrium classifier in the Strategic
Classification Game with no subsidies.
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